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Military intervention into interstate and civil wars is both common and important. 
It lengthens wars, makes them more severe, and shapes how they are fought. Even 
the mere possibility of intervention can alter the course of a war as belligerent 
powers alter their strategies to either encourage or dissuade potential interveners. 
These effects of military intervention are found in both civil and interstate wars. 
Yet, is state intervention into interstate and civil wars essentially one phenomenon 
or are they distinct phenomena? By looking at which states are likely to intervene, 
why and when they intervene, and which wars are most likely to experience 
intervention, it becomes clear the similarities between state military intervention 
into civil and interstate wars are more significant than are the differences. In other 
words, despite some important differences they are subsets of the same 
phenomenon. In both types of wars, allies, geographically proximate states, and 
great powers are more likely to intervene. Also, information revealed by events 
within both types of wars prompts intervention and explains its timing. Last, wars 
in which international organizations become involved, both civil and interstate, 
are more likely to experience intervention. There are, however, important 
differences notably in the areas of cross-border ethnic ties, the presence of great 
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Why Military Intervention Matters 
Interstate and civil wars are often influenced by the actions of states that were originally 
not parties to the conflict. This influence can take a variety of forms ranging from mediation, 
through economic and military aid, all the way to active military intervention.1 Such outside 
involvement in wars is quite common. For example, fully 60% of civil wars experience some 
sort of outside involvement and three-fifths of them attract involvement from multiple states 
(Findley and Teo, 2006). Even restricting the measure to military intervention—the deployment 
of significant numbers of state-led troops into combat—it is striking how often outside states 
become involved in others’ wars.2 Roughly one third of civil wars experience military 
intervention and nearly half of interstate wars do as well, many by multiple states (Sarkees and 
Wayman, 2010). 
Not only is military intervention common, but it also has important implications for 
international security. Military intervention on average makes both civil and interstate wars 
                                                          
1 Finnemore (2003) argues the term “intervention” should be reserved for humanitarian efforts but the literature has 
not restricted the usage of the term in this manner. 
2 Military intervention requires significant actual combat, not simply sending weapons or military advisors. The 
Correlates of War dataset counts states as participants if they suffer 100 combat fatalities or have at least 1,000 
troops engaged in combat (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). While such cutoff points may be a bit high, especially for 
smaller states intervening in wars in conjunction with larger states, the numbers give a rough sense that military 
intervention requires sending a significant number of troops to the war and that they actually engage in combat. Of 
course, at times an outside state will call their own combat forces “advisors” or “volunteers” in an attempt minimize 
the state’s involvement in the war. The key is not the labels used but the scale of the deployment, whether the troops 
are engaged in combat, and whether they are under the control of an outside state. 
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longer and more severe (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and 
Joyce, 2008; Cunningham, 2010; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Gent, 2008; Kalyvas and 
Balcells, 2010; Regan, 2000, 2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Shirkey, 2012a), alters the likely 
outcome of wars (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979; Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), and also 
affects the strategies used by the belligerent parties to prosecute the war (Gleditsch and 
Beardsley, 2004; Shirkey, 2009, 2012b). In fact, the mere possibility of intervention will shape 
belligerent strategies and help determine whether or not a war is even fought (Crawford, 2003, 
2014; Fearon, 1994; Gartner and Siverson, 1996; Jervis, 1994; Leeds, 2005; Leng, 1993; 
Shirkey, 2009; Smith 1995, 1996; Werner, 2000). 
 These effects of military intervention imply that theories of war that do not consider the 
possibility of intervention will be incomplete. This is turn suggests that the best theories of war 
will be ones that can explain war initiation, duration, and termination as part of cohesive whole 
as such theories could answer questions about why wars happen, how they are fought, what their 
effects are, and how they end. This desire for unified theories of war raises questions about if 
civil and interstate wars can be explained by the same theories in general and specifically if 
military intervention in civil wars is similar to or distinct from military intervention in interstate 
wars. Indeed, it is probably necessary to think about the commonalities of various aspects of 
interstate and civil wars prior to any attempt to construct a grand, unified theory of war. Thus, it 
is worth exploring the similarities and differences when it comes to military intervention in 
interstate and civil wars. 
The easiest way to do this is to think through who intervenes, why and when they 
intervene, and which wars are most likely to prompt intervention for both civil and interstate 
wars. On the whole, the answers to these questions about military intervention are quite similar 
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for interstate and civil wars though important differences do exist. This suggests that the same or 
at least similar theories can be used to explain civil and interstate wars, though of course 
intervention is only one aspect of the war puzzle. Each of the above questions about military 
intervention will be covered in turn. 
 
Who Intervenes in Wars? 
 The question of who intervenes in others’ wars has been the most thoroughly explored 
aspect of military intervention. For interstate wars the answer almost always is other states. 
Intervention by non-state actors is more common in civil wars, though often as proxies for 
outside states (Salehyan, 2010). Still, even in civil wars, states are both regular and powerful, 
direct interveners. But which states? Geographic proximity, alliances, and great power status 
have all been found to be good predictors of which states will intervene in both civil and 
interstate wars. Additionally, being the former colonial ruler of a given state and having cross-
border ethnic ties have been found to be good predictors of state intervention in civil wars. 
Though these last two factors indicate that there are important differences in who intervenes in 
interstate and civil wars, the effects of these factors are weaker when compare to the factors held 
in common. Thus, they do not undermine the overarching pattern of similarity between civil and 
interstate wars. 
Geographic Proximity 
First, geographically proximate states—contiguous states and those in the same region as 
the war—are more likely to intervene in both civil and interstate wars (Findley and Teo, 2006; 
Hammerström and Heldt, 2002; Houweling and Siccama, 1988; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; 
Richardson, 1960; Siverson and Starr, 1991; Shirkey, 2009, 2012b; Vasquez, 2009; Wallensteen 
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and Sollenberg, 1998; Ward and Gleditsch, 2002). The scale of this effect is substantial. 
Depending on the study, geographically proximate states are from three to six times as likely to 
intervene in ongoing wars. This strong relationship between proximity and military intervention 
holds for several reasons. First, the military logistics of intervention are far easier for proximate 
states (Boulding, 1962). Supply lines are shorter and for contiguous states, one’s troops need 
only march across the border to reach the conflict. Indeed, outside of a few great powers most 
states cannot deploy military assets to distant continents unaided. On the rare occasion when 
non-great powers do intervene in wars outside of their region they usually do so in conjunction 
with an allied great power (e.g., Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan as a US ally after 9/11), 
with a great powers assistance if not active participation (e.g., Cuban intervention in the Ogaden 
War with Soviet assistance),3 or as part of a United Nations action (e.g., Colombia’s involvement 
in the Korean War).4 
Second, proximate states are more likely to have a strong interest in the outcome of the 
war than are more distant states. While distant states might still have preferences about the 
outcome of the conflict, these preferences are unlikely to be strongly held. Furthermore, the 
limited nature of state resources means that it would be unwise to devote scarce resources to such 
distant, and therefore, less important conflicts. For most states, especially non-great powers, their 
security interests are confined to their own region (Buzan and Waever, 2003) meaning they will 
likewise confine their military efforts to their own region. Also, proximity may create specific 
incentives for intervention that more distant wars would not. For example, a nearby war could 
provide opportunities to annex territory or depending on who won the war threaten the state’s 
                                                          
3 Cuban intervention in Angola is an exception to this pattern. It was done without Soviet aid or even coordination 
(Kessler, 1990). 
4 More will be said of the United Nations’ role in military intervention below. Of course, Colombia’s intervention 
into the Korean War was also done on behalf of and with the assistance of its ally, the United States. 
6 
 
safety. Wars might also create regional instability or disrupt regional economies (Gleditsch, 
2007; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002) providing an incentive to become involved in the war. 
Additionally, proximity can create direct incentives to intervene in the form of refugee flows 
(Kathman, 2010; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Contiguous states in particular may be 
subjected to large flows of refugees fleeing the conflict. These refugees could destabilize that 
state’s economy or politics. This in turn could cause some states to intervene in the conflict in 
hopes of stanching the flow of refugees, though it is not clear that such strategies are effective or 
wise (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). 
Last, proximate states are more likely to be attacked by belligerent parties thereby forcing 
them to intervene (Shirkey, 2009). This may happen because such states possess raw materials 
crucial to the continuation of the war (e.g., Norway in World War Two)5 or are along a 
belligerent’s best line of advance for attacking an enemy (e.g., Belgium in World War One). 
Such gross violations of neutrality appear to be limited to world wars and are the least of the 
reasons that proximate states are more likely to intervene. Thus, proximity creates a number of 
strong incentives and opportunities for military intervention in both civil and interstate wars. 
Alliances 
 Allies of states in ongoing wars are also more likely to intervene militarily than are other 
states (Findley and Teo, 2006; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Shirkey, 2009, 2012b; Siverson and 
King, 1979; Siverson and Starr, 1991). This is especially true if the war in question invokes the 
specific legal obligation spelled out in the alliance treaty (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000). 
Vasquez and Rundlett (2016) even argue that pre-war alliance formation is a necessary condition 
of multiparty wars and hence for military intervention. This is likely a bit of an overstatement as 
                                                          
5 The iron ore Germany was hoping to secure was in Sweden, but the occupation of Norway was deemed necessary 
to prevent the Allies from interfering with the Swedish ore shipments. 
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it is possible to think of wars where military intervention has occurred—such as the Crimean 
War—in the absence of ante-bellum alliance formation. The magnitude of the effect of alliances 
is quite large—roughly comparable in size to the effect of geographic proximity—and again 
varies somewhat from study to study. 
The correlation between sharing an alliance with a belligerent party and military 
intervention results from the fact that alliances are proxies for shared interests (Snyder, 2007). 
Alliances are formed to protect states from threats and also to exploit potential opportunities. So 
if an ally is attacked, this may well be the manifestation of the feared threat. Even if it is not, the 
attack may reduce the ally’s ability to assist when the threat does manifest or reduce the ability to 
exploit any opportunities. The quicker an ally can triumph and return to being a potential aid in 
any future conflict the better. Thus, states will prefer to see their allies win their wars, and 
therefore, will often join their allies’ wars in order to make victory more likely. 
Interestingly, the relationship between alliances and military intervention holds only early 
in wars. As time passes, the likelihood that an alliance will prompt a state to intervene drops 
sharply (Joyce, Ghosn, and Bayer, 2014; Melin and Koch, 2010; Shirkey, 2009; Stevenson, 
2011). Presumably this is because if ante-bellum alliance considerations are insufficient to 
prompt intervention immediately, they never will be sufficient. Certainly, any reputational 
benefit gained from honoring an alliance is lost if the alliance is not honored quickly, meaning 
concerns about being seen as a reliable ally are unlikely to prompt intervention after a war’s 
early stages. More importantly, if a state decided the shared interests represented by the alliance 
were insufficient to warrant military intervention at the war’s outset, it is unlikely these 
considerations would ever be sufficient barring significant changes in the expected intervener’s 
calculations about the likely outcome of the war. More will be said of this below. 
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 Surprisingly, the converse—that states would be more likely to intervene in wars so as to 
oppose longstanding enemies—may not be true. The evidence on whether or not rivals of states 
engaged in wars are more likely to intervene is decidedly mixed with some studies finding rivals 
are more likely to intervene (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, 2007; Lee and Thompson, 2015) 
while others find they are not (Shirkey, 2009). Further study is warranted on the role of rivalry in 
relation to military intervention. 
Thus, alliances are good predictors of military intervention in the early stages of civil and 
interstate wars. This is because they are proxies for shared interests and states often are willing to 
make sacrifices to help their allies win wars. However, this relationship only holds for the early 
stages of a war because if the relationship is insufficient to prompt immediate intervention, it 
likely will never be sufficient barring a change in the expected outcome of the war occurring. 
Great Powers 
 Great powers are also more likely to intervene militarily in ongoing civil and interstate 
wars (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979; Biddle, Friedman, and Long, 2012; Findley and 
Teo, 2006; Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering, 1994; Richardson, 1960; Shirkey, 2009, 2012b; 
Siverson and Starr, 1991; Wright, 1965).6 This is true for several reasons. One, great powers 
have the logistical capacity to project military power far from home, meaning unlike most states 
they can intervene outside of their own region. Also, great powers have important interests in 
many regions around the globe. This means that they have strong preferences in regards to the 
outcomes of many wars, even those that are not geographically proximate. As discussed above, 
                                                          
6 Precise definitions of great powers, especially definitions that do not rely on the behavior of the states, and where 
the cutoff between great and middle powers lies are both notoriously elusive (Gecelovsky, 2009). Great powers are 
defined herein using Levy’s (1981) definition. They are s tates which possess substantial military and economic 
resources, participate frequently and significantly in major international conferences, are given enhanced de facto or 
de jure powers within international organizations, and are states which are recognized as great powers by their 
fellow states and international institutions. They are also states which can project military power far from their 
borders (Richardson, 1960). 
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this distinguishes great powers from most states whose security interests are primarily restricted 
to their own region. Finally, the vast military assets of great powers mean they have the ability to 
influence the outcome of most wars whether near or distant. This is not to say great powers 
always triumph in the wars they become involved in—they certainly do not (Mack, 1975)—but 
rather they have the potential ability to alter the probable outcome of many wars (Altfeld and 
Bueno de Mesquita, 1979). Smaller states’ militaries often cannot materially influence the likely 
outcome of a war, thereby reducing their incentive to intervene. Thus, great powers have greater 
abilities and incentives to intervene in ongoing interstate and civil wars in comparison to non-
great powers. 
Areas of Difference: Former Colonial Powers, Ethnic Ties, and Non-State Actors 
 Three areas of significant difference exist between civil wars and interstate wars in 
regards to which states are likely to intervene.  These areas are the roles of former colonial 
powers, cross-border ethnic ties, and non-state actors. Former colonial powers are more likely to 
intervene in civil wars (Biddle, Freidman, and Long, 2012; Findley and Teo, 2006) but not in 
interstate wars (Siverson and Starr, 1991; Wright, 1965). Likewise, cross-border ethnic ties have 
been found to be a good predictor of which states will intervene in civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and 
Enterline, 2000; Biddle, Friedman, and Long, 2012; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Cetinyan, 
2002; Findley and Teo, 2006; Jenne, 2006; Kathman, 2010; Saideman, 2002; Salehyan, 2010; 
Trumbore, 2003; Woodwell, 2004). No such correlation has been found for interstate wars. 
Finally, non-state actors are more likely to intervene in civil wars than in interstate wars. This is 
likely because civil wars happen most often in weaker states (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and also 
because civil wars weaken states (Taylor and Botea, 2008; Theis, 2005). This places non-state 
actors on a more level playing field with the belligerent powers, meaning their involvement is 
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more likely to significantly impact the war than would normally be the case in interstate wars. 
Also, states often intervene militarily in the civil wars of others indirectly rather than directly by 
using rebel groups as proxy actors (Salehyan, 2010). Such proxy interventions are usually 
sponsored by neighboring states, states with ethnic ties to rebel groups, great powers, and by 
states that are enduring rivals of the target state (Salehyan, 2008, 2010; Shirkey, 2012b). Again, 
this points to the fact that in civil wars non-state actors are able to marshal military forces which 
can contend with those of the state, whereas this is rarely the case in interstate wars. 
Despite these important differences, on the whole there are more similarities than 
differences between civil and interstate wars in regards to who is likely to intervene. Importantly, 
civil and interstate wars share the strongest indicators of who will intervene: geographically 
proximate states, allies, and great powers, whereas the differences between them are in factors 
that are weaker predictors of intervention such as colonial ties. As will be seen below this pattern 
of overarching similarity holds as well for why and when states intervene in civil and interstate 
wars. 
 
Why and When Does Military Intervention Occur? 
The previous section showed that there are significant similarities between civil and 
interstate wars in which states are likely to intervene. Of course, knowing which states are most 
likely to intervene, while useful, is insufficient. Knowing when they are most likely to intervene 
and why they do so is also crucial. One thing that should be immediately obvious is that the 
relatively static variables discussed above such as geography, alliances, and great power status 
will be unable to tell us much about timing (Christia, 2012). While such variables are helpful in 
understanding which states join wars, given that they are invariant over the short and even 
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medium run, they cannot explain when something happens. Rather something must vary in order 
to explain the timing of intervention as many states that intervene militarily in both civil and 
interstate wars wait months or years to join the conflict. If time invariant factors could explain 
intervention in and of themselves, such states would intervene immediately after the outbreak of 
the war. 
In fact, some states do intervene immediately. Of the 102 states in the Correlates of War 
Interstate War dataset that joined ongoing wars, 29 did so in the first 30 days of the war (Sarkees 
and Wayman, 2010). These early interventions tend to reflect ante-bellum alliances (Shirkey, 
2009). This leaves the majority of states as intervening later in wars. This is true for both 
interstate and civil wars (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). If these later interventions cannot be 
explained by the time invariant variables discussed above—recall for instance that the effect of 
ante-bellum alliances on intervention rapidly declines after the first few months of a war—what 
is going on? 
Revealed Information 
The key to the puzzle lies in the fact that wars—both interstate and civil—are bargaining 
processes and that wars are mechanisms for revealing information (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2004; 
Slantchev, 2003; Wagner, 2000). Specifically shifts in power and changes in the belligerent 
parties’ intentions, as revealed by events within wars, cause states to reconsider their initial 
decisions about whether or not to intervene (Shirkey, 2009, 2012b, forthcoming). This helps to 
explain why states would intervene months or years after a war began even though they opted 
not to join at the outset. This revealed information could be linked to a variety of motives for 
intervention including perceived opportunities to revise the status quo, the desire to join one side 
for the intervener’s own protection, a need to balance, and a desire to affect the outcome of the 
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wars they enter (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979; Gent, 2008; Gleditsch, Salehyan, and 
Schultz, 2008). This logic of revealed information triggering intervention can apply as well to 
non-state actors which might intervene in an ongoing civil war. This is important as such 
interventions have become common (Cunningham, 2010; Salehyan, 2010). 
To more fully understand why revealed information plays a critical role in triggering 
military intervention, the nature of war itself must be considered. All wars, whether interstate or 
civil, are a continuation of bargaining in which information about belligerent parties’ relative 
power, reservation points, and goals are revealed and costs imposed causing the range of 
acceptable bargains for all parties to shift (Fearon, 1995; Goemans, 2000; Powell, 2004; 
Slantchev, 2003; Smith, 1998; Wagner, 2000). As belligerent powers learn, they continuously 
weigh the value of proposed offers against the expected value of continued bargaining. This 
leads belligerents to alter both their alignments with their fellow belligerents and their demands 
until an agreement acceptable to all sides is reached (Christia, 2012; Cunningham, 2010). The 
lack of such an agreement, tacit or otherwise, is what causes war (Goemans, 2000). 
Non-belligerent states view ongoing interstate and civil wars in much the same manner 
(Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000) meaning that if an agreement, tacit or otherwise, between a 
belligerent and a non-belligerent unravels intervention will occur (Cunningham, 2010).7 The 
revelation of information may lead directly to such an unravelling. This is because the revealed 
information may indicate a need to balance, an opportunity to pick up spoils, a change to alter 
the war’s outcome, or a chance to obtain a seat at the conference table. Such information is most 
likely to be revealed by battles and significant changes in the composition of governments and 
rebel groups, though other events within interstate and civil wars could reveal information as 
                                                          
7 The notion that the revelation of private information can, at times, increase rather than decrease the likelihood of 
war is supported by formal work (Arena and Wolford, 2012). 
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well. Therefore, military intervention can be thought of as occurring in the following manner. At 
the beginning of an interstate or civil war states decide whether to become belligerents or not. As 
states become privy to new information revealed by the war they alter their beliefs about the 
benefits of belligerency relative to peace and potentially become prompted to intervene. 
 Of course, revealed information is not a sufficient cause of intervention. Only revealed 
information that increases the appeal of belligerency would increase the probability of 
intervention. Information consistent with non-belligerents’ original estimates or which makes 
belligerency less attractive would not increase the likelihood of intervention. Furthermore, not all 
states would respond to revealed information equally. The types of states discussed above as 
more likely to intervene—great powers, proximate states, and allies of belligerent powers—
would be more likely to be responsive to revealed information compared to the general 
population of states. 
Strategic Delay and Domestic Politics 
Other explanations for intervention mid-war are possible, but less convincing or in fact 
indicate that a decision to intervene has not been made. Mobilization, bureaucratic delays, and 
the political mechanisms of actually declaring war could delay intervention. Such factors, 
however, are unlikely to delay intervention for more than a month or two. Also, many states 
faced with such obstacles declare war before the delays are resolved even though it may take 
many months before they can make substantive contributions to the war effort. The United 
States’ entry into World War One is an example of a state intervening well before it could 
make a significant contribution on the battlefield. 
Alternatively, states may be waiting to complete rearmament. It is not clear, however, 
why hostile belligerent states would allow intervention to occur at the time that suits their 
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potential foes. In such cases preemption should occur (Murray, 1984). This sort of 
preemption, however, almost never occurs (Reiter, 1995) This suggests states rarely wait to 
complete rearmament prior to intervening, in turn limiting the number of cases in which states 
would have an incentive to preempt. Thus, while such strategic delay is logical, it appears to 
rarely occur. 
Last, rifts in domestic politics—either among elites or between elites and the broader 
public—could delay intervention. Such divisions are entirely plausible and likely 
commonplace, but their very existence also means that the state has not in fact decided to 
intervene. In other words, domestic politics divisions are not an example of strategic delay, 
but an obstacle to decision-making. For intervention to occur something must happen to allow 
for these divisions to go away or for one side to triumph over the other in debates about war 
and peace. Thus, domestic politics divisions cannot alone explain the timing of intervention as 
some additional factor must cause those divisions to vanish or allow one side’s views to win 
out. Interestingly, there is some evidence that events within the war can play a role in shifting 
power between pro- and contra-intervention camps and can also influence the views within 
those camps (Shirkey, 2009). This suggests revealed information may explain intervention 
even in some cases where domestic politics divisions are relevant. Importantly, all three of 
these alternative explanations—mechanistic delays, strategic delay, and domestic politics—
should apply to military intervention in interstate and civil wars equally. 
 This means that events within wars, in particular those events which are surprising or 
unexpected, are the most compelling explanation why states alter their calculations about the 
benefits of belligerency and decide to intervene militarily. The information revealed by these 
events provides both the motive for and explains the timing of intervention. Of course, the 
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specific motives of interveners may be quite diverse and include at a minimum balancing as well 
as bandwagoning for both territorial and non-territorial spoils (Savic and Shirkey, 2017). There 
is both large-n and case study evidence that revealed information does in fact trigger military 
intervention and explains its timing in both civil and interstate wars (Shirkey 2009, 2012b, 
forthcoming). Thus, for both civil and interstate wars, states either intervene quite quickly based 
on the situation ante-bellum or intervene later in response to information revealed by events 
within the war that suggest their ante-bellum expectations about the course and likely settlement 
of the war were incorrect. 
 
Which Wars Are More Likely to Experience Intervention? 
 Beyond who joins wars, when they join, and why they join, understanding which wars 
are most prone to experiencing military intervention is vital. Yet, it is one of the less developed 
aspects of the military intervention literature. In part, this is because researchers who have tried 
to categorize wars by type have largely focused on the causes of truly catastrophic wars such as 
world wars (see for example Copeland, 2000; Gilpin, 1981; Kugler, 1990; Levy, 1982; 
Midlarsky, 1990; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Thompson, 1988, 1990; and Vasquez, 2009). 
While studying the causes of world wars certainly makes a great deal of sense, they are likely not 
the only wars which are especially prone to military intervention. It seems probable that there are 
other, more limited wars that are more prone to military intervention than the average conflict is. 
Several possibilities exist as to why some wars would be more likely than others to draw in 
outside states. One, the type of states involved in the war, in particular the presence of great 
powers, could alter the odds of intervention. Second, the nature of the cause of the conflict could 
alter the likelihood of intervention. Specifically, are commitment problems a central cause of the 
16 
 
war? And last, regional and global institutions could increase the chances of intervention by 
acting as collective security institutions or by endorsing military intervention in a given war. 
Each of possibilities—and whether or not the implications are similar or divergent for interstate 
and civil wars—will be covered in turn. 
Wars Involving Great Powers 
 Why great powers themselves are more likely to intervene in ongoing civil and interstate 
wars has already been covered. However, this is not the only way in which great powers 
influence the likelihood of military intervention. Their presence in both interstate and civil wars 
impacts the odds that other states will join those wars though the effect is different for civil and 
interstate wars. 
 The presence and especially prior intervention of great powers in interstate wars likely 
alters the scope of the issues over which the war is being fought and the overall stakes of the war 
for regional systems and for the international system as a whole (Kim, 1991; Yamamoto and 
Bremer, 1980). Evidence of this effect is clearest and strongest for the prior intervention of great 
powers in comparison to their presence in an interstate war from the outset (Shirkey, 2009). 
 This effect of great powers increasing the odds of further intervention does not appear to 
translate to civil wars. There is some evidence that the presence of a great power in a civil war 
actually reduces the odds that other states will intervene. Shirkey (forthcoming) finds that the 
presence of a great power in a civil war reduces the odds that another state will intervene for civil 
wars in the Correlates of War dataset but not for civil wars in the PRIO dataset where the 
presence of a great power in a civil war has no effect. The finding in the Correlates of War 
dataset that great powers can dissuade further intervention into civil wars is likely the result of 
the fact that great powers are usually strong enough to discourage other states from intervening 
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in civil wars which occur within the great power itself and perhaps also from intervening in the 
civil wars of states which are located within the great power’s sphere of influence. The null 
effect for the PRIO dataset is likely the result of PRIO covering only the post-1945 period, a time 
when the United States has often intervened in civil wars in conjunction with its many allies. 
This “democratic posse” effect is limited to the post-1945 era (McDonald, 2015) and may 
obscure great powers’ ability to dissuade intervention in their own civil wars and those of their 
allies. Still, the exact nature of the relationship between military intervention in civil wars and 
the presence of great powers is underdeveloped and warrants further study. 
Wars Fought Over Commitment Problems 
Next, interstate wars caused by commitment problems probably are more likely to 
experience military intervention than are wars with other causes. Commitment problems occur 
when one party to an agreement has sufficiently strong incentives to renege that it cannot 
credibly pledge to honor the agreement (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). Commitment problems 
often arise due to expectations of future shifts in relative power or where the agreement itself 
significantly alters relative power (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006; Weisiger, 2013). These expected 
power shifts create incentives for the disadvantaged party to wage a preventive war in the hopes 
of averting the expected power shift (Copeland, 2000; Reiter, 2009; Weisiger, 2013).8 
That there could be a relationship between wars fought over commitment problems and 
wars which experience military intervention is suggested by the fact that both interstate wars 
which experience military intervention and interstate wars caused by commitment problems are 
deadlier and longer on average (Copeland, 2000; Powell, 2006, 2012; Reiter, 2009; Shirkey, 
2012a; Slantchev, 2004; Weisiger, 2013). This correlation hints at the possibility that the higher 
                                                          
8 Commitment problems can also result from incentives to preempt (Fearon, 1995); however, as mentioned above 
preemptive wars are exceedingly rare (Reiter, 1995). 
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severity of such wars is rooted in a common cause. Of course, the fact that both types of wars are 
correlated with higher severity is not enough in itself to establish that wars caused by 
commitment problems are more likely to experience military intervention. That said there are 
strong theoretical reasons to believe wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to 
prompt military intervention than wars are with other causes.  
This is so for two reasons. First, wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to 
produce greater war aims such as state death, regime change, significant territorial annexation, 
and absolutist war-fighting strategies. These goals arise as a way to eliminate the commitment 
problem by attempting to halt or minimize shifts in the future distribution of power (Reiter, 
2009; Weisiger, 2013). Such extensive aims, however, are more likely to substantially alter the 
existing power structure of a sub-region, region, or even the world as a byproduct of the war 
(Weisiger, 2013). Belligerent states benefiting from these power shifts may in turn be unable to 
credibly commit to not use this new advantage to harm third parties. This threat to third parties 
may prompt them to intervene (Shirkey, 2012b; Wolford, 2014a).9 
Second, wars fought over commitment problems are likely to be more severe. This is 
because eliminating a commitment problem often involves the destruction of a state, regime 
change, the destruction of much of the good that is at stake, or a large degradation of a state’s 
power (Leventoglu and Slantchev, 2007; Powell, 2006, 2012; Reiter, 2009; Stanley, 2009; 
Weisiger, 2013). In other words, the severity is the result of the expansive war aims discussed 
above. The greater severity and larger war aims mean these wars are more likely to result in 
significant territorial realignments creating opportunities for interveners to pick up territorial 
                                                          
9 Wars caused by commitment problems may also increase the odds that belligerent states will deem that the stakes 
of the wars are sufficiently high to make it worthwhile to violate the neutrality of neutral states (Shirkey 2015; 
Wolford 2014b). This helps explain that finding discussed above that gross violations of neutrality, such as military 
invasion, generally occur only in world wars. 
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spoils. This increased severity also means belligerent states should be willing to make greater 
efforts to win such wars, and therefore, be desirous of attracting allies to their side in order to 
help with these strenuous efforts.  Taken together, the desire to attract allies and the availability 
of spoils mean that belligerents should be more willing and able to distribute territorial spoils to 
attract allies thereby increasing the odds of outside intervention. Germany’s willingness during 
World War Two to reward bandwagoners such as Hungary with territory is an example of such 
behavior (Savic and Shirkey, 2017). Belligerents should also be more willing to offer non-
territorial spoils, such as aid or promises of future alignment, in order to induce states to 
intervene. Of course, the high costs and risks associated with such wars may also deter potential 
interveners (Haldi, 2003), but for many states the opportunities offered by intervention are likely 
to outweigh these greater costs and risks. 
There is some evidence that interstate wars caused by commitment problems are in fact 
more likely to attract military intervention. A number of studies have established that significant 
pre-war shifts in the relative balance of power are a cause of and good proxy for commitment 
problems (Powell, 2006, 2012; Weisiger, 2013). These pre-war relative power shifts have further 
been shown to be correlated with interstate wars that experience military intervention (Shirkey, 
2015). 
Whether this relationship between wars caused by commitment problems and military 
intervention also holds for civil wars has not been studied. In fact, it seems unlikely to be the 
case. This is because the commitment problems in question would be internal to the state 
experiencing the civil war and thus less likely to threaten regional or global orders. True, the 
commitment problems would still prompt more extreme war aims, but this severity might not 
increase the desire to attract outside aid, as rebel groups in civil wars are already highly likely to 
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be desirous of such outside aid due to their relative weakness and governments are unlikely to 
distribute their own territory as spoils to attract support. Thus, the relationship between interstate 
wars caused by commitment problems and military intervention seems unlikely to translate to 
civil wars. 
The Role of International Organizations 
 Last, international organizations may play a role in determining the rate of military 
intervention. To the extent that the United Nations or various regional organizations act as 
collective security organizations, they would encourage states to intervene in ongoing wars 
against perceived aggressors. In other words, collective security organizations tend to widen 
wars if they failed to deter war in the first place (Betts, 1992; Morganthau, 1973). Indeed, it is 
hard to explain the presence of states such as Colombia and Ethiopia in the Korean War or the 
wide anti-Iraqi coalition in the Gulf War (1990–1991) without the discussing the role the UN 
played in those wars. Likewise, UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in civil wars may 
expand the number of states that become involved in those conflicts. Quantitative studies have 
found some support for both notions (Shirkey, 2009, forthcoming; Uzonyi, 2011) though more 
systematic study is needed. 
Presumably for both civil and interstate wars, the involvement of international 
organizations may lower the diplomatic costs of intervention and even potentially create costs for 
non-intervention (Finnemore, 2003). Also, since interventions conducted under the auspices of 
international organizations are often done by broad-based multilateral coalitions, states with 
weaker logistical and power projection capacities may be able to intervene by piggy-backing off 
of the logistical capabilities of great power allies that are also intervening. Of course, this could 
occur without the involvement of international organizations and may be a factor in the 
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relationship discussed above between the presence of great powers in interstate wars and further 
military intervention. 
Thus, wars in which the stakes are raised (through the presence of great powers and 
commitment problems) and wars where the costs of intervention are lowered (through the 
involvement of international organizations and perhaps also great power allies that provide 
logistical support) are more likely to experience military intervention than are other wars. In 
general, these factors appear to be more important for interstate wars than for civil wars, though 
that varies depending on the factor being considered. However, wars where costs are raised—




 As can be seen from the above discussion, there are more commonalities between 
interstate wars and civil wars when it comes to the nature and causes of military intervention 
than differences. The effects are similar: longer, more severe wars and shifts in the likely 
outcomes and strategies employed. Likewise, which states are prone to intervention is largely 
similar. In both interstate and civil wars great powers, geographically proximate states, and states 
allied to one of the belligerent parties are more likely to intervene. Another strong similarity is in 
the motives for and timing of intervention. Events within interstate and civil wars which revealed 
information to non-belligerent states cause those states to reconsider whether they wish to 
intervene. Revealed information also explains the timing of those states’ interventions. Last, the 
involvement of international organizations increases the odds of military intervention in both 
interstate and civil wars. 
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 There are, however, important differences. Some of the clearest differences arise in who 
is likely to intervene in wars. Former colonial powers are more likely to intervene in the civil 
wars of their former colonies, but not in the interstate wars of their former colonies. Also, while 
cross-border ethnic ties are a strong predictor of intervention in civil wars, the result has not been 
found to transfer to interstate war. Similarly, how the presence of one or more great powers in a 
conflict affects the chances of future military intervention differs sharply between civil and 
interstate wars. The presence of great powers in interstate wars increases the odds of future 
military intervention, while their presence in civil wars appears to either have no effect or to 
reduce the odds of future military intervention. Last, wars caused by commitment problems are 
correlated with increased military intervention in interstate wars, but the relationship is unlikely 
to hold for civil wars. 
 Overall the similarities outweigh the differences suggesting that future lessons learned 
about intervention in interstate wars may well apply to civil wars and vice versa. This fits with a 
general view that it is unwise to draw sharp lines between interstate and civil wars when 
constructing theories or even more broadly between international relations and comparative 
politics. The forces at work between and within states are often the same or at least have parallels 
in the other sphere. Likewise, many of the insights about military intervention are drawn from 
general theories of war. This suggests that future studies of military intervention should seek to 
set intervention within both the broader international relations literature and also seek to link 
explanations of intervention in interstate wars with those in civil wars. Likewise, studies of both 
interstate and civil war must account for intervention as both its occurrence and even just its 
possibility shape how those wars are fought. It is only by keeping these linkages and broader 
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literatures in mind that we can truly understand the nature of military intervention and the other 
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